Russia/Ukraine INTSUM 27FEB22–1; 1056 Eastern/1756 Kyiv

[Originally posted on author’s Facebook page; post is publicly available.]

Let’s start big and work our way down. By big I mean, I’ll try to rank the issues by their potential strategic implications, and move on down to the tactical points.

1.) President Putin has reportedly ordered Russian nuclear “deterrent” forces to go on “high alert” in response to “aggressive statements” by NATO. Specifically, Putin said, “Western countries aren’t only taking unfriendly actions against our country in the economic sphere, but top officials from leading NATO members made aggressive statements regarding our country,” and that the nuclear forces will be put in a “special regime of combat duty.” It is currently unclear what this will entail, but it is a very provocative move that may well entice NATO countries to react similarly. The point, as of now, is likely to remind the world that Russia is still a big bad superpower despite their difficulties in invading a much weaker neighbor. The problem, however, is if these forces go on alert, there’s not much wiggle room for further reminders as to how powerful Russia supposedly is without actually using them. It’s one thing to carry a gun to the store; it’s another thing entirely to brandish that gun, waving it around and threatening people. It is not outside the scope of reason that an increasingly frustrated Putin authorizes the use of tactical nuclear weapons, which was largely unthinkable not so long ago. The question though is how does Russia do that without risking a dramatic escalation; how does Putin do it while convincing the West that he’s not going to use strategic nuclear assets? I’d like to think that it won’t come to this, but at this point it’s anyone’s guess. Regardless, I cannot imagine the West not elevating their alert statuses. WH Press Secretary Jen Psaki said, “We have the ability to defend ourselves.” At some point, events sort of transpire by themselves. And as I said the other day, an isolated, fearful Russia is a dangerous Russia, indeed.

1.a.) According to a Kremlin document allegedly published on 02 June 2020, “Russian strategy embraces limited nuclear employment in future regional conflicts to “compel an end to a conventional conflict,” that Russia starts.” This is called “escalate to de-escalate.” The document is called “Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Sphere of Nuclear Deterrence.” I have not read this document at this time, but I may look at it if I get a chance.

1.b.) We need to keep in mind just how isolated Russia must feel at this moment. They’ve already threatened Sweden and Finland with “consequences” should they entertain entering NATO. Support is flooding into Ukraine as Russian forces are stymied from achieving most of their objectives. Even the PRC is slow walking support to Russia back a bit. It’s hard to stay friends when your friend is throwing haymakers at everyone in his vicinity and acting very irrationally. A Chinese state-affiliated media outlet released a video of Chinese students in Kyiv asking for peace. While subtle, this is a shift. Nothing is released on Chinese media without official PRC approval; this could be the PRC’s way of signaling to RU.

1.c.) There’s been a lot of speculation on the status of Putin’s health. The speculation makes sense, but I’m not entirely sure it’s helpful. Marco Rubio eluded to “knowing something” based on his being the Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, but having worked in intelligence for twenty years, I always hate it when people say, “I know a thing but I cannot tell you that thing because it’s super secret so just trust me.” No one is all that qualified to make any sort of diagnoses as to Putin’s health.

2.) A group of “negotiators” have left the Kremlin (at “high speed”) to engage in “peace talks” with a Ukrainian delegation. The Ukrainian president’s office has confirmed that they will meet “without preconditions” on the Belarusian border. I hope that I am wrong, but I suspect that nothing will come out of these negotiations. Not a single thing. Russia will not be negotiating in good faith, but UA’s Foreign Minister Kmytro Kuleba is saying the “no preconditions” element is “already a victory.” UA continues to best RU in messaging.

3.) It is now being reported that Turkey is considering the invasion of Ukraine a war, and that the Montreux Convention might not apply. They still haven’t closed the straits to Russian warships, but it’s growing increasingly possible. This may not have an immediate impact, as it doesn’t necessarily apply to ships stationed in the Black Sea, but it would send a message.

4.) Ukraine is stating that it has repulsed all efforts to penetrate and take Kharkiv and that UA forces still hold the city. Based on the multiple videos I’ve seen, this looks to be true. Russian ground forces — infantry — was seemingly advancing without any sort of support. Reports are that RU sent a unit of Spetsnaz, their elite special forces, into Kharkiv and it was evidently repelled with ease.

5.) Magomed Tushayev, a top associate of Ramzan Kadyrov, was almost certainly killed in Hostomel. UA Alpha Group was fighting Chechens there. Reports are that the Kadyrov fighters have suffered extraordinary losses. These forces were tactically competent…thirty years ago. They likely devolved in the intervening time into a band of fear-mongering thugs ill-equipped (training-wise) to fight a modern military force. Still, given their reputation, deserved or not, that’s bad for Russian morale.

6.) Speaking of messaging, Ukraine is apparently allowing POWs to call home. There also appears to be a significant haul of POWs over the last few days. As an aside, the amount of pictures of destroyed and/or abandoned Russian vehicles is absolutely stunning.

7.) Tu-22 Blinder launched cruise missiles from inside Belarusian territory last night, much like I thought they might. Ukraine claims to have intercepted at least one cruise missile with air defense assets. Again, it’s important to note that UA air defense has seemingly not been eroded whatsoever, and RU has not remotely established air supremacy, which is utterly stunning.

8.) Rumor has it that Russian forces have been ordered by the General Staff to take Kyiv by Monday, no matter the cost. NFI at this time, but I am highly skeptical of RU’s ability to “take Kyiv” by Monday.

9.) Multiple sources are confirming that Russian forces in Hostomel/Antonov have destroyed the An-225 Mriya. The plane was a beautiful sight; a massive cargo plane unlike any other in operation. If you’re at all into aviation, this is a sad event.

Post-Script: US official says that Russia is launching about 100 missiles a day; 320 since the start of the invasion. This is not likely sustainable. The Russians seem to be relying heavily on their missile capabilities, as their ground forces are unable to achieve objectives.

Russian logistical issues in this invasion are nothing short of a debacle. This is a study of what not to do.

More to come, I’m sure. Thanks for reading. And thank you to everyone who is sharing these posts.